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Abstract: We propose an extended principal-agent model considering employee commitment and 
describe how to motivate committed agent, who not only shows regard for his own income but 
also cares the organizational benefit. The principal also would like to provide support to such an 
agent and his utility depends on both the final profit and the payoff to the agent. There are some 
interesting insights into the characteristic of optimal contracts: First, commitment is an effective 
motivator and committed employee needs less monetary inducement to perform his job well than 
one who not. More specifically, undifferentiated pay is sufficient in incentivizing committed agent 
to implement high effort in some cases. Second, commitment and wage differential are 
substitutable to each other in the optimal incentive compensation design. Third, commitment is not 
always good for organizational efficiency when the increase in employee commitment relies on the 
principal’s support. Our model's finding is consistent with employee incentive in some 
organizations, and also help to incentive mechanism design under wages differential constraints 
and understanding excessive compensation. 
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Introduction 
Employee commitment is a familiar topic in management research. Many 
scholars, such as Mowday, Porter & Steers (1982); McElroy, Morrow, Power & 
Iqbal (1993); Meyer & Allen (1997); Becker, Billings, Eveleth & Gilbert (1996) 
have deepened people’s understanding of it. There are various forms through 
which employee commitment can be analyzed and deconstructed. Organization 
commitment is the most typical among all the concepts and the earliest to be 
widely studied. In this paper, an explanation of commitment will be made on the 
basis of organizational commitment. As described by Mowday, Porter & Steers 
(1982), committed employees are characterized as loyal and productive, and 
identify with organizational goals and organizational values. They are dedicated 
to the organization and put forth extra effort on its behalf. Consequently a wide 
array of desirable behavioral outcomes, such as good job performance, a high 
attendance rate, was found to be associated with employee commitment (e.g. 
Becker (1992); Becker, Randall & Riegel (1995); Blau & Boal (1987); Meye & 
Allen (1997)). Moreover, due to its potential benefits for organizations, 
commitment is typically valued by its practitioners, as managers prefer loyal and 
devoted employees (Paula C. Morrow, 1983). The above studies have suggested 
or implied the significance of the connection between employee commitment and 
organizational benefit and have shown that committed employees care about 
organizational benefit. Therefore, having a sense of commitment can affect the 
utility function of employees. They consider not only their own benefit but also 
the benefit of the organization. Furthermore, employees make a trade-off between 
their own benefit and organizational benefit depending on their commitment level. 
It is clear that employee commitment is linked to behaviors that tend to benefit the 
organization. 
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Since the publishing of a series of ground-breaking papers, including 
research by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1974, 1976) 
and Holmstrom (1979), the basic principal –agent model has been greatly 
developed to solve of the problem of moral hazard. A method of using the 
principal-agent model to deduce optimal contracts becomes increasingly widely 
applied to inspire employees. However, optimal contracts in the classic model 
may sometimes be limited in actual operation. That is, for one thing, almost all 
optimal compensation schemes are based on variables (such as output or profits) 
that are observable. But in some cases the output or profits are hard to evaluate 
and measure in practical management. Additionally, although economic theorists 
have put forth their best efforts to construct optimal compensation for workers, 
the use of optimal compensation schemes in practice is not without its drawbacks 
(Prendergast (1999); Gibbons (1998)). For example, Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) indicate that in a multitasking environment, workers will be inspired to 
over-perform on well rewarded tasks and to underperform on poorly rewarded 
tasks. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Lazear (1989) show that workers may have 
incentive to sabotage one another when the payment is based on relative 
performance. George Becker (2000) also stresses that incentive contracts may 
induce gaming, noncooperative behavior and dysfunctional consequences when 
an organization has to use the distorted performance measure, since it is hard to 
find “good” performance measures in most cases. Therefore, in the 
aforementioned cases we need to rely instead on employee commitment to 
improve incentive, as commitment has been proven to be effective in inspiring 
employees. Bringing the concept of commitment into the principal-agent model 
can deepen our understanding of managerial policies such as incentive strength 
and optimal payment. We argue that employee commitment is also an important 
source of motivation and has a marked effect on optimal compensation schemes. 
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Inculcating employee commitment is critical to enhance an organization’s 
efficiency. 
In the conventional principal-agent model, the agents’ utility function only 
describes their own benefit. However, committed employees’ behavior is 
inconsistent with this utility function in classic principal-agent theory, because 
individuals not only care for their own payoff but also for organizational benefit. 
In some other economic theories, such as altruism and reciprocity theories, the 
benefit of others appears as a positive component in an individual’s utility 
function (Andreoni, 1990), or the principle of reciprocity acts as a constraint on 
traditional individual utility maximization (Sugden, 1984). While most of the 
literature referring to altruism and reciprocity theories discusses the public goods 
provision problem, it does not consider the moral hazard problem at the micro-
level. Moreover, commitment is somewhat different than altruism and reciprocity. 
Firstly, altruism theories predict a negative relationship between the contributions 
of others and those of the individual (Charles R. Plott, Vernon L. Smith, 2008). In 
contrast, commitment theories predict a positive relationship between the 
contributions of others and those of an individual. Secondly, the principle of 
reciprocity states that an individual must contribute when others are contributing, 
thus no cheap or “free rides” are permitted (Rachel T.A. Croson, 2007). However, 
commitment does not ask for the condition of others’ contributions, thus allowing 
for “side-bets” (Becker, 1960). 
The goal of this paper is to extend the classic principal-agent model, by 
incorporating commitment, in which the principal and agent’s utility depends not 
only on wage but also on commitment. The model illustrates that commitment is 
an effective source of incentive under some conditions. We integrate the notion of 
commitment in our model, where a committed agent’s utility also includes the 
benefit of an organization. As with regard to the principal, his utility is not only 
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related to his own profit but also related to the agent’s payoff, due to 
organizational support. Under the action of commitment, the agent’s utility 
changes instead to the sum of his own utility, which comes from payoff, and the 
expected profits multiplied by the commitment coefficient. In turn, the principal’s 
utility changes to the sum of his own utility which comes from profit, and also the 
agent’s payoff multiplied by the support coefficient. We further will deduce 
optimal compensation. Then we will discuss how commitment affects the 
motivation of the agent and the structure of optimal compensation. Combined 
with the reality of management, we give an analysis of employee incentives in 
various situations. The model which is discussed in this paper overcomes some 
limitations of the compensation contract deduced from the classic model, which 
must be solely carried out by wage differentials to inspire high employee effort. 
On one hand, the optimal compensations of this model indicate that if employee 
incentive is going to function well, it should not rely solely on monetary 
compensation schemes, but should also rely on employee commitment and 
organizational support1. An employee who is committed to the organization needs 
less monetary incentives to excel in job performance than one who is not 
committed. On the other hand, the optimal contracts are inclined to pay an 
undifferentiated wage when employee commitment is high enough. Additionally, 
the employee commitment can also reduce the gap between differentiated wages 
when they need to be set. We find that commitment and wage differential are 
virtually interchangeable in the optimal incentive design. These characteristics of 
optimal compensation are useful in management practice. Managers need to have 
a better understanding of how to incentivize committed employees and what is the 
                                                 
1 Employee commitment and organizational support is a pair of relative concepts in our paper. They have 
been proved to coexist in many studies. There is usually a positive relationship between them. Organizations 
staffed by committed employees often support their employees. For committed employees' potential benefits 
to organizations, we argue that the ability of organizations to hire workers who commit to them and the 
creation of such commitment are central to organizational efficiency.  
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optimal compensation to committed employees, and make a distinction among 
different cases, avoiding the loss of committed employees. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we discuss 
employee commitment in more detail and how commitment affects work 
incentives. In Section 2, we lay out the basic model and study optimal contracts. 
Section 3 explores applications of the model, and Section 4 offers our main 
conclusions. 
1 Commitment and Incentives 
Commitment is regarded as an attitudinal variable for most management 
scholars, which is characterized by an enduring psychological attachment (e.g. 
Mark John Somers and Dee Birnbaum, 1998). It can be conceptualized as a 
construct with multiple foci, such as organization commitment, supervisor 
commitment, occupational commitment, workgroup commitment. Organization 
commitment has been researched most widely and deeply amongst all of the 
constructs. A case is made here with reference to organizational commitment. It is 
necessary to explain that if another focus of commitment is substituted for 
organization, the interaction mechanism between commitment and incentive is 
nearly the same.     
Studies on commitment over the previous decades have flourished. The most 
accepted definition of organization commitment is regarded as an emotional 
attachment to an organization that includes acceptance of organizational values 
and a desire to remain with the organization, which was put forth by Porter et al. 
(1974) in initial studies. Arnon E. Reichers (1985, p.468) reconfirms the view of 
Porter et al. (1974) that commitment consists of “a.) a belief in and acceptance of 
organizational goals and values, b.) the willingness to exert effort towards 
organizational goal accomplishment, and c.) a strong desire to maintain 
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organizational membership”. Meyer and Allen (1984, 1997) consider this 
definition as one dimension of organization commitment, which was termed 
affective commitment to the organization. In addition, Mowday, Porter and Steers 
(1982)’s study is also consistent with the earlier definition. They present this 
interpretation using the term attitudinal commitment, and maintain that it reflects 
how individuals identify with an organization, and that they are willing to work on 
its behalf. They relate attitudinal commitment to behavioral commitment and 
suggest there is a cyclical relationship between the two. Apart from these, 
numerous investigations about the development of the OCQ (organizational 
commitment Questionnaire) construct their work on the basis of the 
aforementioned widely-used understanding of the term, such as Allen and Meyer 
(1990), Olive (1990), Brown (1996), Meyer, Allen and Topolnytsky (1998), 
Meyer and Herscovitch (2001), and Aaron Cohen (2007). All of these studies on 
organization commitment consistently suggested that the core of commitment is 
the individual’s care for the benefit of the organization. Therefore, commitment is 
useful to economists because it suggests a natural means by which an individual’s 
preference can vary. 
Individuals who commit to their organization always identify with the goals 
and values of that organization. They regard themselves as an insider of the 
organization, and enjoy being a member of it as such. Allen N. J. and Meyer J. P. 
(1990) argued similarly that they truly feel as if the organization’s problems are 
their own and as if they are “part of the family”. Mael F. A., & Ashforth B. E. 
(1992) also noticed that employees are interested in how others view their 
organization and consider the success of organization as their own. Begley & 
Czajka (1993) suggest that committed employees might experience a stronger 
sense of honor than those who are less committed. When someone praises the 
organization, it is perceived as a personal compliment. When someone criticizes 
8 
the organization, on the other hand, it feels like a personal insult. Organizations 
have a great deal of personal meaning for committed employees. They feel a 
strong sense of belonging to their organization. It is obvious that the benefits 
related to the organization will contribute to committed employees’ utility. Their 
utility will increase as the benefit of the organization increases, and decrease as 
the benefit of organization diminishes. Therefore, we can soundly consider that 
commitment plays an important role on the employee’s utility, similar to the work 
provided by George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton (2005), who added identity to the 
worker’s utility function. We try to combine both the economic and commitment 
components of utility to yield a formula that summarizes our discussion of these 
employees’ utility. 
We argue that organization commitment which is characterized by the 
employee’s care about the benefit of organization will change the employee’s 
preference and affect his utility function. Considering commitment, the 
employee’s utility will not only rely on his own benefit but also on the benefit of 
the organization. That is, the employee’s utility includes two parts, one brought 
about by his wage and the other brought about by the profit of organization. We 
use w  to denote the employee’s wage, use β  to measure the employee 
commitment level, and use π  to denote the profit of organization. We can 
express the employee’s utility function as follows: 
)()( 21 πβ aaa UwUU +=                                          (1) 
The utility function in the formula above reflects that a committed employee 
is motivated not only by monetary compensation but also by his commitment. The 
tradeoff between maximizing his own benefit and organization’s profits is 
dependent upon the employee commitment.  
Organizational support is a construct which is closely related to organization 
commitment. They are coexisting or simultaneous in organization for the long 
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term2. Organizational support and organization commitment are interdependent 
and interact with each other, even at times caused and effected by one another. 
Scholars engaged in organizational behavior research termed the phrase Perceived 
Organizational Support (POS) in their literature. Earlier work by Buchanan (1974) 
described organizational support simply as the organization recognizing 
employees’ contributions and fulfilling promises to them. In subsequent research, 
Eisenberger et al. (1990) develop more precisely the content of organizational 
support, specifying three-fold the ways through which the organization: a.) 
provides employees with needed support, b.) values employees’ contribution, and 
c.) cares about employees’ well-being. The theoretical work of both Buchanan 
(1974) and Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-LaMastro (1990) observed a positive 
relationship between POS and organization commitment. Further, in their research 
on commitment, Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly (1990) also show that organizational 
“dependability” enhances organization commitment by the organization’s sharp 
willingness to fulfill its promises towards employees. Some other empirical 
studies have also shown that perceived organizational support was strongly related 
with organizational commitment. For example, O’ Driscoll and Randall (1999) 
have demonstrated that perceived organizational support was significantly linked 
with organizational commitment, as examined by the study of samples of dairy 
workers in Ireland and New Zealand. The verification of Organizational 
Commitment develops when interrelated Organizational Support is increased, as 
                                                 
2 Many studies on organizational behavior use two potent theories to explain this phenomenon. One is social 
exchange theory; the other is role identity theory. The former states that the transactional quality of social 
interactions is based on the fact that individual actors are self interested and instrumental. Actors are 
motivated to enhance their own rewards, and their concern about others’ rewards is contingent on whether 
that concern serves their own self-interest. It means the stable employee-organization relation is also based on 
both parties caring about each other. And both parties are likely to pursue more social exchange, not only 
economic exchange. The latter states that the individual, on a certain role, who must be able to rely on the 
reciprocity and exchange relation with its counter role (Haslam, 2001). From this perspective, interrelated 
individuals perform unique but integrated activities, and the meaning and expectations are tied to each of 
these roles, regarding performance and the relationships between the roles. That is, the employee and 
organization are a pair of counter roles, who are tied to each other, and care more or less about each other’s 
benefit. It is typically regarded as the Organizational Support and employee Commitment.  
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seen in numerous literature in both theoretical research and empirical studies, such 
as those mentioned above (e.g. O’Driscoll and M. Randal (1999); Eisenherger, 
Fasolo and Davis-LaMastro (1990)). To summarize, most of the studies found that 
a stable level of employee commitment coexists with the support of the 
organization. It is thus logical to assume a close relationship between 
organizational support and employee’s organizational commitment based on 
evidence from a large body of research. Therefore, with regard to the employee 
commitment, we must at the same time take into consideration the effect of 
organizational support.  
Considering the significant relationship between commitment and 
organizational support as previously demonstrated, we must now define more 
specifically the meaning of organizational support. The term is regarded as 
describing the extent to which the organization values employees’ contributions 
and cares about their well-being (Eisenberger, Fasolo, & Davis LaMastro, 1990; 
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986). We take this definition as 
the basis for our understanding of organizational support. Whitener (2001) also 
agrees with this definition, elaborating that an organization’s care and concern 
about the well-being of an employee will convey information about the 
organization’s benevolence and good will leading to perceptions of its 
trustworthiness in the eyes of the employee. The intrinsic meaning of 
organizational support as is to “fulfill its exchange obligation of noticing and 
rewarding employee efforts made on its behalf” (Eisenberger et al., 1990, p. 57). 
This idea expressly unifies the above descriptions, and thus the concentrated 
expression of organizational support can focus on the concern with employee’s 
benefit, organizational support may be expressed as that organization’s preference 
include caring about the employee’s benefit. The utility function of organization 
contains two parts. One part is the utility from the profit of an organization, and 
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another part is the utility from the benefit of the employee. Specifically, the latter 
consists of the utility from payoff and the disutility from the cost. We use v  to 
denote the employee’s utility from payoff, use α  to denote the organization’s 
support, and use g  to measure the cost of the employee’s effort level. We can 
express the organization’s utility function as follows: 
),()( 21 gvUwUU
ppp απ +−=                                     (2) 
When both the organization and the employee's utility function are analyzed 
as above, it is obvious that commitment and organizational support will affect 
incentive's effectiveness. Further, it will affect the design of optimal 
compensation. We argue that the optimal compensation paid to committed 
employees depends on both the agent’s commitment level and principal’s support 
level. We will lay out the extended principal-agent model considering 
commitment and study optimal contracts in the following section. 
2 The Model 
2.1 The Environment and Preferences 
A “firm” consists of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The 
principal needs the agent to carry out a project. The project's outcome can be 
“success” or “failure”: if the outcome is “success”, the principal receives the 
project profit π , 0>π  ; if the outcome is “failure”, the project profit is 0. 
The probability of the success outcome is dependent on the effort supplied by 
the agent, e , at a cost, )(eg . Effort has two levels, “high” or “low”, },{ LH eee∈ . 
Effort is unobservable and hence non-contractible. If the effort supplied by the 
agent is “high”, the probability of the success outcome is 1p . In contrast, if the 
effort supplied by the agent is “low”, the probability of the success outcome is 
2p , 21 pp > . 
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If the project profit is π , the principal pays to agent 1w , 01 ≥w  ; if not, the 
project profit is 0, the principal pays to agent 2w , which implies that the agent 
has to be given payment level at least of 2w  every period, irrespective of 
performance, 02 ≥w . And we assume 21 ww ≥ . 
Consider the agent who has commitment and the utility function as equation 
(1). More specifically, we can think of that the utility of such agents depends on 
their own payoff, and the expected organizational benefit. We will refer to the 
parameter β  as the agents’ commitment level, 0≥β . Although their utility still 
depends positively on their own income and negatively on effort, they are 
motivated not only by their own income, but also by caring intrinsically about the 
benefit of the organization. The utility function of the agent is comprised of three 
parts. The first part is the utility from private income which is noted by )(wv , 
satisfying 0)( >′ wv ， 0)( <′′ wv ， 0)0( =v , and also Inata condition 
+∞=′→ )(lim0 wvw , and 0)(lim =′+∞→ wvw . The second part is the disutility from the cost 
of effort which is denoted by )(eg  . The third part is the utility from 
commitment, which is expressed by the product of β  and the benefit of the 
organization. Based on the above assumptions, the agent’s utility function can be 
expressed as  
.2,1,)()()1()( 21 =+−−+= ipegwvpwvpU iiia πβ  
Consider the principal who is the representative of the firm. The principal 
would like to support the agent and has a utility function as equation (2). More 
specifically, we can think of that the utility of such principal depends on both the 
13 
final profit and the payoff of the agent. We assume the parameter α  as the 
support level of principal, 0≥α . Based on the above assumptions, the principal’s 
utility function is 
.2,1)],()()1()([))(1()( 2121 =−−++−−+−= iegwvpwvpwpwpU iiiip απ  
The principal’s optimal contracting problem solves: 
2,1)],()()1()([))(1()( 2121, 21
=−−++−−+− iegwvpwvpwpwpMax iiiiww απ       (3) 
Subject to:  
2,1,)()()1()( 21 =≥+−−+ iupegwvpwvp iii πβ                  (PC)  
πβπβ iiiiii pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp +−−+≥+−−+ )()()1()()()()1()( 2121  
},{,2,1 LH eeei ∈=    (IC)   
The equation (P C) is the participation constraint of the agent. We take the 
agent’s reservation payoff 0≥u  to be exogenously given. The equation (IC) is 
the incentive-compatibility constraint, which stipulates that the effort level 
maximizes the agent’s utility given ),( 21 ww . 
We consider how the principal optimally implements each of the two 
possible levels of e  below, as the method in Hart and Holmstrom (1987), 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). We first solve the optimal compensation scheme 
when implementing low effort. Second, we solve the optimal compensation 
scheme when implementing high effort. 
2. 2 Implementing low effect Le  
Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level Le . In this case, 
2ppi = , and substituting this into the principal’s optimal contracting problem (3), 
and the two constraints. Letting 0≥λ , 0≥μ  denote the multipliers on 
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constraints (PC) and (IC), respectively, 1w , 2w  must satisfy the following Kuhn-
Tucker first-order condition3: 
    
1222
2
1)( pppp
pwv μμλα −++=′                                    (4) 
)1()1)((
1)(
12
2
2 pp
pwv −−−++
−=′ μμλα                             (5) 
The following proposition 1 characterizes the optimal contract when the 
principal wishes to implement effort level Le . The proof of proposition 1 is 
presented in the Appendix.  
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level 
Le . Letting πβ 2/)]()([ pwvueg LL ∗∗ −+= and )(/)]()([ 21 ppegeg LH −−=∗ πβ , 
the optimal contract is characterized by the following:  
(a) When ∗< ββ , the optimal contract is: 
∗− =′== wvww )1(121 α ,                 if 
∗> Lββ     
])([ 2
1
21 πβpeguvww L −+== − ,         if ∗≤ Lββ  
  (b) When ∗≥ ββ , the optimal contract does not exist. 
There are some interesting insights into the role of the agent’s commitment 
in changing the level of optimal incentive pay. First, equilibrium solution does not 
exist when the agent’s commitment level is higher than a certain value ( ∗≥ ββ ). 
An employee would not engage in low effort work when his commitment is high 
enough.  
Second, when implementing Le  , the optimal compensation contract is 
characterized by undifferentiated wages, i.e. 21 ww = , irrespective of performance. 
                                                 
3 The Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition is derived by examining 
0)()()()(/ 1112121221 =′−′+′+′+−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα ,
0)()1()()1()()1()()1()1(/ 2122222222 =′−−′−+′−+′−+−−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα
. 
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Consistent with the management practices, this case does not require pay-for-
performance. It is worth mentioning that the equilibrium solution is always 
undifferentiated wages when implementing Le  in the classic principal-agent 
model, because the utility of agent at low effort is always higher than that at high 
effort under fixed wages and the incentive-compatibility constraint does not work. 
However, in our model, even with the condition of undifferentiated wages, the 
incentive-compatibility constraint may bind sometimes here. Because that the 
utility function of the agent includes the part, πβ ip , and 21 pp >  . Therefore, 
the utility of the agent at low effort may be lower than that at high effort when the 
commitment is high enough. 
Thirdly, when the agent’s commitment β  is low enough ( ∗≤ Lββ  or 
∗< ββ ), the optimal payment is ])([ 2121 πβpeguvww L −+== − . The 
participation constraint of agent is binding in this case. The optimal compensation 
is similar to the equilibrium solution of the classic principal-agent model. The 
undifferentiated payment is in relation with the agent’s commitment. The optimal 
wage will decrease when the agent’s commitment increases, while the optimal 
wage will increase when the agent’s commitment decreases. Specifically, when 
the agent’s commitment decreases to 0, the optimal payment is the same to the 
equilibrium solution of the classic principal-agent model. 
Fourth, as the agent’s commitment is increasing into the interval
∗∗ << βββ L , the undifferentiated payment will only depend on the principal’s 
support. The wage will increase as the principal’s support is increasing. It implies 
that the principal pays to agent entirely according to his willingness to support. 
16 
Both of the two constraints do not play a role on this optimal compensation 
solving. The principal maximizes his utility without any constraints here, which is 
impossible in the classic principal-agent model. That is, although the principal can 
go on with reducing the wage which could also be accepted by the agent, he 
would not like to do it because of his support to the agent. We can call this 
optimal compensation “Willingness Payment”. Obtaining the “Willingness 
Payment” calls for the agent’s commitment to not be lower than ∗Lβ . 
We now offer a corollary of the above proposition, which are useful in 
understanding the effect of the principal’s support α  on incentive wages design.  
COROLLARY 1: Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level 
Le . As the principal’s support α  is increasing, the agent’s commitment β  
more likely fall in the interval ∗> Lββ  . And the possibility of obtaining 
equilibrium solution ∗w  is increasing.  
The Proof is simply put as below: Since )/1/()]()([ 2πβ pwvueg LL ∗∗ −+= , 
and ∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α , we have when α  increases, ∗w  will increase, 
and ∗Lβ  will decrease. It means the possibility of ∗> Lββ  increases. So the 
possibility of obtaining equilibrium solution ∗w  increases. 
In conclusion, suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level Le , the 
characteristics of equilibrium solutions are undifferentiated wages. There are three 
important properties of the solutions. First of all, the undifferentiated wages will 
increase as the principal’s support is increasing when the agent’s commitment 
higher than a certain level. Secondly, the undifferentiated payment is related to the 
agent’s commitment when the agent’s commitment is lower than a certain level, 
and the wage will decrease when the agent’s commitment is increasing. Thirdly, 
the possibility of obtaining the “willingness wage” will be increased as the 
principal’s support α  is increasing. Besides, we also deduce that there does not 
exist an equilibrium solution when the agent’s commitment is too high here. 
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2.3 Implementing high effect He  
Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level He . In this case, 
1ppi = , and substitute this into the principal’s optimal contracting problem (3), 
and the two constraints. Also letting 0≥λ , 0≥μ  denote the multipliers on 
constraints (P C) and (I C), respectively, 1w and 2w  must satisfy the following 
Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition4: 
  
1
2
1)(
1
p
p
wv
μμλα −++=′                                    (6) 
  
1
2
2 1
1
)(
1
p
p
wv −
−−++=′ μμλα                                 (7) 
The following proposition 2 characterizes the optimal contract when the 
principal wishes to implement effort level He . The proofs of proposition 2 are 
presented in the Appendix. 
In order to state proposition 2 clearly, we define Hββ ~= , when satisfy 
α=′−+′ )ˆ(/)1()ˆ(/ 2111 wvpwvp .In here, )/()]()([)ˆ( 21122 ppegpegpuwv LH −−−= , 
and βπ−−−−−−= )/()]()1()()1[()ˆ( 21121 ppegpegpuwv LH , the function
)(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp ′−+′  is monotone decreasing about β , so it exists the only 
solution to satisfy the equation. 
We also define 11 ww =  and 22 ww = . They are the solutions when satisfy 
both of the equations α=′−+′ )(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp and 
βπ−−−=− )/()]()([)()( 2121 ppegegwvwv LH . 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level He , 
letting πβ 1/)]()([ pwvueg HH ∗∗ −+=  and )(/)]()([ 21 ppegeg LH −−=∗ πβ , 
the optimal contract is characterized by the following: 
(1) When ∗> ββ , the optimal compensation is as below.  
                                                 
4 The Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition is derived by examining 
0)()()()(/ 1211111111 =′−′+′+′+−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα , 
0)()1()()1()()1()()1()1(/ 2221212112 =′−−′−+′−+′−+−−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα
. 
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∗− =′== wvww )1(121 α                  if  
∗> Hββ   
))(( 1
1
21 πβpeguvww H −+== −          if  ∗≤ Hββ  
(2) When ∗≤ ββ , the optimal compensation is as below. 
11 ww = , 22 ww =                                if  Hββ ~≥  
))()1()()1((
21
121
1 βπ−−
−−−−= −
pp
egpegpuvw LH ,      if  Hββ ~<  
))()((
21
121
2 pp
egpegpuvw LH −
−−= −   
The first part of the proposition 2 shows that when the agent’s commitment 
is high enough ( ∗> ββ ), undifferentiated wages are set irrespective of 
performance. In this situation, if the agent’s commitment is higher than a certain 
level ( ∗Hβ ), the wage payment is only in relation to the principal’s support. If the 
agent’s commitment is lower than a certain level ( ∗Hβ ), the wage payment is in 
relation to the expected profit of organization and agent’s commitment. The 
undifferentiated wage will decrease if the expected profit of the organization and 
the agent’s commitment are increasing. It is impossible to obtain the equilibrium 
solution characterized by undifferentiated wages when implementing high effort 
in the classic principal-agent model. However, it could attain here when the 
incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind, even if the participation 
constraint also does not bind, because of the effect of the principal’s support and 
the agent’s commitment. This is due to that the agent always enjoys implementing 
high effort when the agent’s commitment high enough, or although the constraints 
still allows the payment to go on to decrease, the principal does not want to do 
that and would rather pay the “willingness wage”.    
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The second part of Proposition 2 shows that when the agent’s commitment is 
lower than a certain level ( ∗≤ ββ ), the differentiated wages are linked to the 
performance. In the case of differentiated wages, when Hββ ~< , the optimal 
payment 1w  changes not only rely on the expected profit of organization but also 
rely on the agent’s commitment. The optimal payment 1w  will decrease when 
β  or π1p  is increasing. When the agent’s commitment level belongs to the 
interval, ∗≤≤ βββH~ , low wage 2w  is lower than ∗w  and high wage 1w  is 
higher than ∗w . 
We have ∗β deduced from the incentive-compatibility constraint, which 
corresponds to the lowest commitment level required by the condition of the 
agent’s utility with high effort surpassing that with low effort under 
undifferentiated wages. ∗Hβ  corresponds to the lowest commitment level which 
ensures implementing high effort of the agent under the principal’s “willingness 
wage”. 
Proposition 2 summarizes two different cases of implementing high effort 
level. When the agent’s commitment is higher than the lowest commitment level 
which satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraint, the agent always chooses 
high effort no matter which kind of undifferentiated wages. It is only needed to 
consider the participation constraint in this situation. If the agent’s commitment is 
higher than the lowest commitment level which ensures implementing high effort 
under the principal’s “willingness wage”, the optimal compensation is always the 
“willingness wage”. If not, the optimal compensation is the undifferentiated 
wages when the participation constraint is binding. When the agent’s commitment 
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is lower than the lowest commitment level which satisfies the incentive-
compatibility constraint, the optimal compensation is always differentiated wages. 
That is, in this situation, only differentiated wages can satisfy the incentive-
compatibility constraint.     
We now offer two corollaries of the proposition 2, which are useful in 
understanding the effect of the principal’s support α  on incentive wages design.  
COROLLARY 2: Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level 
He . As the principal’s support α  increasing, agent’s commitment β  are more 
likely fall into the interval ∗> Hββ  . And the possibility of obtaining the 
equilibrium solution ∗w  is increasing.  
The Proof is simple as below: Since πβ 1/)]()([ pwvueg HH ∗∗ −+= , and 
∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α , we have when α is increasing, ∗w  will increase, and 
∗
Hβ  will decrease. It means that the possibility of ∗∗ ≤ ββH  is increasing, and 
also means that the possibility of ∗> Hββ  is increasing. So the possibility of 
obtaining equilibrium solution ∗w  is increasing. 
COROLLARY 3: Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level 
He . As the principal’s support α  is increasing, agent’s commitment β  more 
likely fall into the interval Hββ ~≥ , in which it always can obtain equilibrium 
solution 11 ww = , 22 ww = . And the possibility of obtaining this equilibrium 
solution will increase.  
The proof is simple as below: Since Hββ ~=  satisfy 
α=′−+′ )ˆ(/)1()ˆ(/ 2111 wvpwvp , and )(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp ′−+′  is a monotone 
decreasing function about β , so when α  is increasing, 1w  will increase, and 
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Hβ~  also will decrease. It means that the possibility of Hββ ~≥  is increasing. So 
the possibility of obtaining equilibrium solution 11 ww = , 22 ww =  will  
increase. 
In conclusion, contrasting the results of the first part of proposition 2 with the 
second part of proposition 2, it yields interesting insights into the role of agent’s 
commitment in the changing of the pattern of incentive pay, and its role in 
changing the level of optimal incentive pay. The equilibrium solution to 
implement high effort is also undifferentiated wage irrespective of performance 
when the agent’s commitment is high enough. The equilibrium solution to 
implement high effort is differentiated wage when the agent’s commitment is 
lower than a certain level, however, the disparity between differentiated wages 
will reduce when the employee commitment is increasing.  
2.4 Summary of the optimal contract 
Given the preceding analysis, which kind of effort that the principal should 
choose to inspire depends on the dispersion of the expected utilities under 
different effort levels. There are two cases here5. When the agent’s commitment is 
higher than the lowest commitment level which satisfies the incentive-
compatibility constraint, the principal’s optimal choice is inspiring high effort, 
and the optimal contract is undifferentiated wage. When the agent’s commitment 
is lower than the lowest commitment level which satisfies the incentive-
compatibility constraint, the principal’s optimal choice depends on the 
comparison of expected utilities under two effort levels. This is related to the 
                                                 
5 It is obviously deduced from proposition 1 and 2. 
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expected profit, wage, probability of different profit, the principal’s support, the 
cost of effort, and also the agent’s commitment. Although we cannot precisely 
point out the principal’s optimal choice, we have clearly analyzed the relationship 
between commitment and optimal compensation. The characteristics of optimal 
compensation in each possible effort level are enough to illustrate the relations 
between the agent’s commitment and payment, which is exactly the central 
question that concerns us.  
We summarize several important results from the optimal compensation 
payment when implementing either of the two possible effort levels. First of all, 
the characteristics of optimal payment illustrate that commitment is an effective 
motivator. In the classic principal-agent model, the principal must rely on the 
wage differential to inspire the agent to exert high effort. But here, 
undifferentiated wage also can inspire the agent to exert high effort when the 
agent’s commitment is high enough. Moreover, the agent would not implement 
low effort when his commitment is high enough. 
Second, commitment and wage differential are substitutable to each other in 
the optimal incentive compensation design. Commitment can compress the wage 
differential. Compared to the classic principal-agent model, our model can realize 
effective incentive without expanding the wage differential. A committed 
employee needs less monetary inducement to perform his job well than one who 
has no commitment. Commitment helps to solve the incentive problem that 
differentiated wage could not resolve. Moreover, the differentiated wages usually 
incur efficiency loss induced by more income risks, given the risk aversion 
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preference of the agent. It means the principal needs to pay more expected wages 
to risk-averse agents. More than that, it is difficult to set effective differentiated 
pay in many situations of practical management. For example, differentiated 
wages are always based on observable performance. When the performance is 
hard to observe or the real profit is difficult to evaluate, it is impossible to set 
differentiated pay accurately and efficiently. More than that, differentiated pay 
may have some negative impacts, bringing about such occurrences as over-
competition and interpersonal disharmony. This point of view is supported by 
Lazear (1989), who demonstrated that workers have the incentive to sabotage one 
another when compensation incentive intensity is tight on the basis of relative 
performance. In the above cases, we need pay more attention to the function of 
commitment to achieve more effective incentive scheme. Conversely, when it is 
hard to inculcate and promote employee commitment, we need to emphasize more 
the effectiveness of differentiated pay. 
Third, commitment is not always good for organizational efficiency when the 
increase in employee commitment totally relies on the principal’s support. That is, 
when employee commitment is higher than the lowest commitment level which 
satisfies the participation constraint, the optimal compensation is the principal’s 
“Willingness wage”. Even though the constraint allows the payment to decrease 
even lower than “Willingness wage”, but due to the principal’s support, the 
optimal payment is not lower than “Willingness wage”. Furthermore, the 
“Willingness wage” will increase as the principal’s support is increasing, which 
means efficiency loss. So, although the organization’s support always improves 
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employee commitment and then may help to improve organizational efficiency, it 
may reverse in this situation. 
3 Applications 
The benchmark for our analysis is the case where the principal provides 
support to the agent and the agent is committed to the principal. The model 
describes how to motivate committed agents, and explains why committed agents 
are met with great favor in all kinds of organizations. A number of recruitment 
methods in recent years have leaned toward screening employee commitment, and 
investments have leaned toward developing employee commitment not only in 
for-profit but also in nonprofit organizations (Paul lles, Christopher Mabey, Ivan 
Robertson, 1990; Greguras Gary J., Diefendorff James M., 2009). The model 
developed here is well placed to consider employee motivation. In this section, we 
discuss several main contexts in which the ideas apply. We begin with a 
discussion of a kind of organization staffed by committed employees. We then 
discuss the case of wages differential constraints. Finally, we discuss excessive 
welfare and some other issues.  
3.1 Nonprofit Organizations  
Nonprofit organizations are often staffed by committed agents. They aim to 
provide collective goods centered around a specific goal, such as Environmental 
Protection, Charity, and Relief Agencies. Specifically, we refer to organizations 
which are focused on humanitarian efforts, such as the Red Cross, Doctors 
without Borders, and others. Workers employed in these sectors are typically 
25 
committed employees, who inevitably identify with the organization’s goals and 
values, and are willing to be participants within the organization, and therefore put 
forth extra effort to achieve organizational goals (José Alatrista, James 
Arrowsmith, 2004). Burton A. Weisbrod (1988) observes that workers in 
nonprofit organizations have quite different motivations from those who work in 
for-profit organizations, and they also have different work goals. Specifically, the 
goals of workers in nonprofit organizations are more directly linked to the goals 
of the organization as a whole. Furthermore, the nonprofit organization model, 
which is developed by Glaeser (2002) states more precisely that employees cared 
directly about the output of their organization. All of the above research 
emphasized that employees in nonprofit organizations are different from those in 
the for-profit sector, and thus means of incentivizing these two types of 
employees will be quite different. 
 Many studies on nonprofit organizations support our argument. On one 
hand, workers employed in nonprofit organizations tend to earn lower wages than 
in other types of organizations. Preston (1989) analyzed the wages of employees 
working in different types organizations in the United States. He found that 
managers and professionals employed by nonprofits earned 20% less than their 
counterparts in for-profits, after controlling human capital, demographic structure, 
occupation, flexibility and rigidity of work schedules. Other studies such as 
Linden, Pencil, and Studley (1989) and Studley (1989), which focused solely on 
lawyers, also found that the fixed wages in nonprofit law firms are almost 40% 
lower than in private practices. This number is as high as 66% for New York City 
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lawyers working in large non-profits, compared with those employed in for-profit 
organizations. A later investigation controlling employee gender, choice of 
curriculum, and academic performance, Frank (1996) similarly found that the 
salary of graduates who were employed in nonprofit organizations is about 59% 
less on average than those who were employed in for-profit organizations, based 
on an employment survey conducted on Cornell University graduates. In view of 
all of the above evidence, Femida Handy & Eliakim Katz (1998) summarize that 
nonprofit organizations tend to pay their employees a lower wage than for-profit 
organizations. On the other hand, Sherwin Rosen (1986) suggested that different 
types of organizations may have different preferences in choosing wage 
differentials. His theoretical viewpoint has become dominant throughout the field. 
Many empirical studies show that the wage differential in nonprofit organizations 
is markedly different from other types of organizations (Laura Leete, 2000, 2001). 
The classical model demonstrates that the principal always needs to pay 
higher wages and expand wage differentials to inspire high effort. In reality, 
nonprofit organizations often pay lower wages than for-profit organizations, and 
also do not set strong incentives for their employees. We can therefore see that the 
classic principal agent model does not explain the phenomenon cited above. Our 
framework in this capacity can provide an explanation and shed some light onto 
previous discrepancies. Most studies in labor literature may ascribe small wage 
differentials to the character of organizational culture, lack of funding and non-
profit orientation (Rosemarie Emanuele, Susan H. Higgins, 2000; J. Cheverton, 
2007). However, our model illustrates the main reason for this phenomenon is the 
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existence of commitment, which can inspire employees to implement high effort 
in these organizations, and thus they do not need such large wage differentials. 
We can thus see that commitment is an effective motivator for employees in these 
organizations, and monetary incentives alone are not sufficient in motivating a 
higher caliber of work. Our model also explains in particular how to motivate 
those employees who care about the organization’s benefit in nonprofit 
organizations. Although nonprofit organizations often attract employees who 
identify with their goals and values, however, if the organizations ignore support 
for their committed agents in the long term, they also may face difficulty in 
recruiting more committed agents or could also lower the motivation of those 
already employed in the organization.         
3.2 Wages differential constraints 
External forces have at times placed constraints on wage differentials. This 
can occur for a variety of reasons. First, the law may impose high income tax in 
some countries, especially in the high welfare states of Europe. The strength of 
labor unions who constrain wage differentials is another example of the influence 
of an external force. Organizations in those contexts are unable to carry out high-
strength efficiency wages. For example, Mahmood Arai (1994) maintained 
through his research that the wage differentials of the Swedish labor market are 
not as large as those in the U.S. Second, nearly all efficiency wage schemes 
should be based on performance measures that are observable. However, we 
cannot often find performance measures that perfectly coincide with the agent's 
effort, which may present us with serious problems. As George Becker (2000) 
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stresses, incentive contracts may result in negative behavioral consequences when 
an organization has to use the distorted performance measure. Moreover, many 
performance measures cannot be precisely evaluated. An example of the 
difficulties in evaluating performance measure was demonstrated by Holmstrom 
(1982), Baker (1992) and McLaughlim (1994), who state that agents’ effort is 
hard to indicate in teamwork. If we must use subjective evaluation, other 
problems may arise, such as discrimination (Bentley MacLeod, 2003). We can 
deduce therefore the wage differentials is restricted by performance measure, 
which itself may be distorted, and also due to its inability to be precisely 
evaluated. Third, efficiency wage carried out through wage differentials may also 
bring forth some negative effects in actual operation, for example, over incentive. 
A series of problems such as vicious competition, disharmony, and 
noncooperation may occur due to this practice. As mentioned in the previous 
section of this paper, the work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) and Lazear (1989) support this argument, discussing the problems 
of excessive incentive in multiple task and tournament situations. In order to 
avoid these negative effects on organization, wage differentials may be used in 
restriction. The three reasons cited above reveal that it is imperative in some 
situations for organizations to pay attention to inculcating employee commitment. 
It may be the main reason why some organizations take employee commitment 
seriously while others do not.  
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3.3 Excessive Compensation 
According to our model, when employee commitment reaches a certain level, 
the principal will pay the willingness wage to the agent, but this willingness wage 
is not necessarily so high, thus resulting in excessive compensation. According to 
generally accepted principles of management, one of the most important reasons 
to improve an employee’s well-being is to enhance the employee’s motivation. 
Many companies have attached importance to rewarding employees in recent 
years. They carry out versions of welfare programs, and increasingly, kinds of 
profit sharing schemes have been used to encourage employees. Organizations 
spare no effort in their quest to further employees’ well-being and anchor their 
hope on inspiring the employee to work hard. The enhancement of employees’ 
welfare clearly reflects the increase of organizational support. 
However, our model reveals that such organizational support which is mainly 
pushed forward by enhancing employees’ welfare is not always effective for 
improving organizational efficiency. This occurs due to the fact that if increasing 
employees’ welfare can improve employee commitment, it is effective in 
inspiring the employee, while if not, it is not effective. In actuality, when the 
employees’ welfare has already been at a relatively high level, its increase cannot 
improve the employee commitment effectively, and cannot push forward 
organizational efficiency any more. Thus when the increase of employee 
commitment occurs at a slower rate than the increase of organizational support, 
this leads a situation in which the increase of employees’ welfare is not very 
effective in inspiring employees, but instead only increases the expenditure of the 
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organization. Increasing employees’ welfare is insignificant for improving 
organizational efficiency in this case, and it is a waste of the organization’s 
resources.  
Although organizational support plays a central role in arousing employee 
commitment in most cases, it may also sometimes lead to excessive 
compensation. There are many non-effective employee welfare programs in 
practice. Take Total Reward for example, which is a complete salary system of 
return to employees, offered by the America Compensation Association (Robert 
L. Heneman, 2002). Total Reward is theoretically quite useful in inspiring 
employee commitment as it is been effective in implementing organizational 
support mechanisms. However, some cases of its application in practice have 
already been found to be ineffective in improving organizational efficiency (A. 
Verbruggen, 2006). Our finding may explain the discrepancy between theory and 
practice in some cases, and reveal the root cause of these practical failures, which 
is that increased compensation plays no role in improving incentive, and is also 
useless for organizational efficiency. Our model describes the mechanisms of 
organizational support that best encourage employee commitment, and is 
therefore a practical tool in determining which level of support is necessary in any 
specific case. It further provides a good reference for designing the optimum 
welfare system for the organization.  
3.4 Other Issues 
Our model also can be expanded to other cases in which the employee’s 
utility is related to organizational profit. For instance, we can interpret the 
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commitment parameter in our model as the employee’s share of the organization’s 
benefit. The usage of this new interpretation will account for Partnership, 
Employee Stock Ownership, Occupational Pension Systems, Profit-Sharing 
Programs and so forth. In start-up companies, the creation of a company often 
begins with an effective entrepreneurial team who demonstrate characteristics of 
industriousness, loyalty, solidarity and cooperation under a high risk environment. 
These team members are so passionate and highly motivated because they share 
the benefits of the organization after its success, and are simultaneously deeply 
committed to the company. Although given a low fixed wage in the initial stage of 
the company's development, the members will always work hard and are 
incentivized by the increasing potential benefit of the company. It can also 
feasibly explain why people take pleasure in engaging in pioneering ventures, 
even to the extent of removing themselves from other potential chances for high 
salaries in low-risk situations.         
4 Concluding Remarks 
In recent years, an increasing number of researchers working on employee 
incentive have incorporated psychological characteristics into economic models as 
sources of intrinsic motivation. Commitment is typically included as one form of 
intrinsic motivation. Regarded as a psychological attachment to the organization, 
commitment prominently changes the employee's preference, which is 
demonstrated through the employee’s care about the benefit of the organization 
via his utility function. From basic sociological theories including the principle of 
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social exchange and reciprocity, we can deduce that organizational support 
usually coexists with commitment.  
This paper provides a simple model to explain how employee commitment 
has an effect on optimal compensation and how to incentivize committed 
employees. There are three main results that can be deduced from our model. 
First, we can see that commitment is an effective motivator. Committed 
employees are more inclined to work hard, and need less financial incentive than 
non-committed employees. When sufficient commitment exists, a fixed wage may 
be enough to inspire employees to put forth high effort. Second, commitment can 
be a substitute for wage differentials in playing the role of an incentive. Wage 
differentials can be reduced in the optimal incentive design when employee 
commitment exists. So, a more compressed optimal compensation scheme will be 
provided to committed employees. Third, an increase in commitment may even 
have some negative effects on organizational efficiency when the principal pays a 
“willingness wage” to the agent. In this situation, "willingness wage" loses its 
effect on incentive and is beyond the minimum necessary wage used to inspire 
high effort.  
These findings provide a potentially instructive way to cover the shortage of 
explicit incentive schemes, which solely rely on financial incentive that may 
undermine the real benefit of an organization in the long run. The advantage of 
our model is in considering commitment as an intrinsic motivation and deducing 
its potential effect on optimal compensation, which is more consistent with actual 
situations in management. Therefore, our model well-explains why it is 
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unnecessary to use wage differentials to inspire employee in nonprofit 
organizations, and also provides a viable solution in the case of restricted wage 
differentials. Moreover, this model reminds organizations to be careful to avoid 
excessive welfare, as in many cases increased welfare is misperceived to also 
increase employee motivation  
Further discussions of this model may proceed in at least two ways. In the 
first, we have seen that the commitment parameter in our model is exogenous. In 
future work, it would be of great interest to develop the commitment parameter as 
endogenous, to describe the generation of commitment in more detail, and to 
understand how commitment interacts with the governance and culture of 
organizations. The second way of developing the analysis of this model is to 
conduct empirical research and illustrate quantitative evidence. Both 
psychological questionnaire surveys and methods of experimental economics can 
be utilized to push forward these related research endeavors. In this paper and in 
future discussion and analyses of this model, we must always consider methods of 
inspiring committed employees as a main focus. 
APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level Le . The principal’s 
optimal contracting problem solves: 
)]()()1()([))(1()( 22122212, 21 Lww
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Subject to: 
 upegwvpwvp L ≥+−−+ πβ 22212 )()()1()(                (P C) 
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As mentioned in section 2.2, we let 0≥λ , 0≥μ  denote the multipliers on 
constraints (PC) and (IC), respectively. We have Lagrange Equation as follow: 
 
 
    
The solutions of the principal’s optimal contracting problem, 1w  and 2w , 
must satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition: 
0)()()()(/ 1112121221 =′−′+′+′+−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα ,
0)()1()()1()()1()()1()1(/ 2122222222 =′−−′−+′−+′−+−−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα
. 
These conditions can simplify as equations (4) and (5) as mentioned in 
section 2.2. 
To prove Proposition 1, we distinguish four cases according to either the 
participation constraint or incentive-compatible constraint binding or not. 
 
(a) When 0=λ , 0=μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following three 
conditions.  
upegwvpwvp L >+−−+ πβ 22212 )()()1()(                          (1.1) 
πβπβ 1211122212 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp HL +−−+>+−−+           
                                                             (1.2) 
α
1)()( 21 =′=′ wvwv                                              (1.3) 
Substituting 0,0 == μλ  into the Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition, we get 
equation (1.3). From (1.3), we get the optimal compensation 
∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α . Substituting ∗w  into (1.1), we have 
upegwv L >+−∗ πβ 2)()( . Letting 
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and )(/)]()([ 21 ppegeg LH −−=∗ πβ  . 
We can infer ∗> Lββ  from (1.1), and ∗< ββ  from (1.2).  
So, if ∗∗ << βββ L , the optimal contract is ∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α  . If 
∗∗ ≥ ββ L , the optimal contract does not exist. 
It shows that if the equilibrium solution exist, the optimal contract is 
undifferentiated wage, irrespective of performance, when ∗∗ << βββ L . 
(b) When 0=λ , 0>μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions. 
upegwvpwvp L >+−−+ πβ 22212 )()()1()(                      (1.1) 
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Since 21 pp >  , we have 0)/1( 21 <− ppμ , and 0))1/()(( 221 >−− pppμ  . 
So we can infer 21 ww <  from equations (1.5) and (1.6), which contradicts with 
the assumption 21 ww ≥ . 
    So this case cannot exist. 
(c) When 0>λ , 0=μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions. 
upegwvpwvp L =+−−+ πβ 22212 )()()1()(                      (1.7) 
πβπβ 1211122212 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp HL +−−+>+−−+  
(1.4) 
λα +=′=′
1)()( 21 wvwv                                     (1.8) 
From (1.8), we can infer 21 ww = , so we get 
πβ 221 )()()( peguwvwv L −+==  from (1.7), and ∗< ββ  from (1.4).  
As 0≥β  and 0)( ≥wv , we get πβ 2/)]([0 pegu L+≤≤  from 
πβ 221 )()()( peguwvwv L −+== . 
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Since (1.8) αλα /1)/(1)()( 21 <+=′=′ wvwv , we can infer ∗>= www 21  . 
And combine this to the condition πβ 2/)]()([ pwvueg LL ∗∗ −+= , so we can 
deduce that ∗≤ Lββ . It is obvious that πβ 2/)]([ pegu LL +≤∗ . 
So we have: if ∗∗ ≤< Lβββ  or ∗∗ <≤ βββ L , the optimal contract is 
])([ 2
1
21 πβpeguvww L −+== − . All of the above cases potentially satisfy 
πβ 2/)]([ pegu L+≤ . The optimal contract relies on the expected profit and 
agent’s commitment.  
(d) When 0>λ , 0>μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions. 
upegwvpwvp L =+−−+ πβ 22212 )()()1()(                          (1.7) 
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Similarly as (b), we can infer 21 ww <  from (1.9) and (1.10), which 
contradicts with the assumption 21 ww ≥ . 
    So this case cannot exist. 
Summarize the above four cases, the optimal contract is characterized by the 
proposition 1 when suppose that the principal wishes to implement effort level 
Le . 
Proof end. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
Suppose the principal wishes to implement effort level He . The principal’s 
optimal contracting problem under moral hazard solves: 
)]()()1()([))(1()( 21112111, 21 Hww
egwvpwvpwpwpMax −−++−−+− απ       
Subject to: 
 upegwvpwvp H ≥+−−+ πβ 12111 )()()1()(                 (P C)       
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As mentioned in section 2.3, we also let 0≥λ , 0≥μ  denote the multipliers 
on constraints (P C) and (I C), respectively. We have Lagrange Equation as 
follow: 
 
 
    
The solutions of the principal’s optimal contracting problem, 1w  and 2w , 
must satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition: 
0)()()()(/ 1211111111 =′−′+′+′+−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα , 
0)()1()()1()()1()()1()1(/ 2221212112 =′−−′−+′−+′−+−−=∂∂ wvpwvpwvpwvppwL μμλα
.  
These conditions can simplify as equations (6) and (7) as mentioned in 
section 2.3. We distinguish four cases according to either the participation 
constraint or incentive-compatible constraint binding or not. 
(a) When 0=λ , 0=μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions. 
upegwvpwvp H >+−−+ πβ 12111 )()()1()(                           (2.1) 
πβπβ 2221212111 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp LH +−−+>+−−+  
                                                             (2.2)
α
1)()( 21 =′=′ wvwv                                             (2.3) 
Substituting 0,0 == μλ  into the Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition, we get 
equation (2.3). We can infer the equilibrium solution is ∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α  
from (2.3). Substituting ∗w  into (2.1), we have upegwv H >+−∗ πβ 1)()( . 
Letting πβ 1/)]()([ pwvueg HH ∗∗ −+= , we can deduce ∗> Hββ  from (2.1), and 
∗> ββ  from (2.2).  
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So, when },max{ ∗∗> Hβββ , the optimal contract is 
∗− =′== wvww )/1(121 α . It shows that in this case, the optimal contract is 
undifferentiated wage, irrespective of performance. Compare to proposition 1, we 
can find that agent chooses different effort lever depend on his own commitment 
level under the same payment. The principal’s support level decided the optimal 
pay level totally. 
(b) When 0>λ , 0=μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions.  
upegwvpwvp H =+−−+ πβ 12111 )()()1()(                          (2.4) 
πβπβ 2221212111 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp LH +−−+>+−−+    
                                                            (2.2) 
λα +=′=′
1)()( 21 wvwv                                          (2.5) 
Since (2.5), we can infer 21 ww = . Substituting this into (2.4) , we can get 
πβ 121 )()()( peguwvwv H −+== . As 0≥β  and 0)( ≥wv , we can get 
πβ 1/)]([0 pegu H+≤≤ .  
We also can deduce ∗> ββ  from (2.2) as the case (a). 
Since )(wv′  is a strictly decreasing function, and combine with equations 
(2.3) and (2.5), we can infer ∗>= www 21 .And for )(wv  is a strictly decreasing 
function about β , and πβ 1/)]()([ pwvueg HH ∗∗ −+= , we have ∗≤ Hββ in this 
case. It is obviously that πββ 1/)]([ pegu HH +≤≤ ∗ .  
So, when ∗∗ ≤< Hβββ , the equilibrium solution is 
))(( 1
1
21 πβpeguvww H −+== − .  
(c) When 0>λ , 0>μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following four 
conditions simultaneously. 
upegwvpwvp H =+−−+ πβ 12111 )()()1()(                           (2.4) 
πβπβ 2221212111 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp LH +−−+=+−−+  
                                                             (2.6) 
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We solve equations (2.4) and (2.6), and get 
21
12
2
)()()(
pp
egpegpuwv LH −
−−=                                (2.9) 
βπ−−
−−−−=
21
12
1
)()1()()1()(
pp
egpegpuwv LH                    (2.10) 
Since )()( 21 wvwv ≥ , we can deduce ∗≤ ββ  from equation 
βπ−−−=− )/()]()([)()( 2121 ppegegwvwv LH , which is inferred from equation 
(2.6).                    
Solving equations (2.7) and (2.8) , we get   
)
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−=μ                                (2.11)  
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μμαλ +−−′=                                    (2.12) 
Substituting (2.11) into (2.12), and since 0>λ , we get 
α>′
−+′ )(
1
)( 2
1
1
1
wv
p
wv
p                                         (2.13) 
Letting α=′−+′ )(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp , and we mark 11 wˆw = , 22 wˆw =  and 
Hββ ~=  in this situation. Since )(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp ′−+′  is a monotone 
decreasing function about β . Therefore, we can infer Hββ ~<  from (2.13).   
So we have when Hββ ~<  and ∗≤ ββ , the optimal contract is  
))()((
21
121
2 pp
egpegpuvw LH −
−−= − , 
))()1()()1((
21
121
1 βπ−−
−−−−= −
pp
egpegpuvw LH . 
(d) When 0=λ , 0>μ , the optimal contract must satisfy the following 
conditions. 
upegwvpwvp H >+−−+ πβ 12111 )()()1()(                          (2.1) 
πβπβ 2221212111 )()()1()()()()1()( pegwvpwvppegwvpwvp LH +−−+=+−−+  
                                                           (2.6) 
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We also get ∗≤ ββ  from equation (2.6) as the case (c). 
Combine (2.1) with (2.4), we get 
21
12
2
)()()(
pp
egpegpuwv LH −
−−>                             (2.16) 
βπ−−
−−−−>
21
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1
)()1()()1()(
pp
egpegpuwv LH                 (2.17) 
Combine (2.14) with (2.15), we get 
 α=′
−+′ )(
1
)( 2
1
1
1
wv
p
wv
p                                      (2.18) 
Since Hββ ~= , satisfy α=′−+′ )ˆ(/)1()ˆ(/ 2111 wvpwvp , combine with (2.16) 
and (2.17), and )(/)1()(/ 2111 wvpwvp ′−+′  is a monotone decreasing function 
about β . So we have Hββ ~≥  here.  
Therefore, when ∗≤ ββ  and Hββ ~≥ , the optimal contract is: 11 ww = , 
22 ww =  , as defined in section 2.3. 
Proof end. 
 
References  
 
Akerlof George, Rachel Kranton (2005) Identity and the Economics of Organizations. Journal of      
Economic Perspectives 19(1): 9-32 
A. Verbruggen, Xavier Baeten (2006) Total rewards from an employee perspective. Scientific. 
136-144 
Andreoni J, Miller J (2002) Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency 
of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica 70(2): 737-753 
Andreoni, J (1990) Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow 
Giving. Economic Journal 100:464-477 
Arnon E Reichers (1985) A Review and Reconceptualization of Organizational Commitment.  
The Academy of Management Review 10(3):465-476 
Becker H S (1960) Notes on the concept of commitment. American Journal of Sociology 66：32-
42 
41 
Becker T E, Billings R S, Eveleth D M, Gilbert N L (1996) Foci and bases of commitment: 
implications for job performance. Academy of Management Journal 39(2): 464-482 
Becker T E (1992) Foci and bases of commitment: are they distinctions worth making? Academy 
of Management Journal 35(1): 232-244 
Becker T E, Randall D M, Riegel C D (1995) The multidimensional view of commitment and the 
theory of reasoned action: a comparative evaluation. Journal of Management 21(4): 617-638 
Benabou Roland, Jean Tirole (2003) Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Economic 
Studies 70(3): 489-520 
Blau G J, Boal K R (1987) Conceptualizing how job involvement and organizational commitment 
affect turnover and absenteeism. Academy of Management Review 290 
Blau P M (1964) Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley 
Bolton G E，Ockenfels A (2000) ERC--A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition[J]. 
American Economic Review 90(1): 193-208 
Buchanan B (1974) Building organizational commitment: The socialization of managers in work 
organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 19: 533-546 
Burke, Peter (Editor) (2006) Contemporary Social Psychological Theories. Palo Alto, CA, USA: 
Stanford University Press pp 24-41 
Canice Prendergast (2008) Intrinsic Motivation and Incentives. American Economic Review 
98(2): 201-205 
Canice Prendergast (2007) The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats. American Economic Review 
97(1): 180-96  
Charles R Plott, Vernon L Smith (Editor) (2008) Handbook of experimental economics results. 
Differentiating altruism and reciprocity Vol.1 RTA Croson 
Dewatripont Mathias, Ian Jewitt, Jean Tirole (1999) The Economics of Career Concerns，Part II: 
Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies. Review of Economic 
Studies 66(1): 199-217 
Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004) A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity[J]. Games and 
Economic Behavior 47:268-298 
Eisenherger R, Fasolo P, Davis-LaMastro V (1990) Perceived organizational support and 
employee diligence, commitment and innovation. Journal of Applied Psychology 75:51-59 
Frey, Bruno, Reto Jegen (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 
15(5): 589-611 
George P. Baker (1992) Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. The Journal of 
Political Economy 100(3): 598-614 
Gibbons, Robert, Michael Waldman (1999) Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence, in 
Handbook of Labor Economics. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science, pp. 2373-2433 
Gibbons, Robert (1998) Incentives in Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 115-
32 
Goodsell, Charles ( 2004) The Case For Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: CQ Press 
42 
Gould-Williams J, Davies F (2005) Using social exchange theory to predict the effects of HRM 
practice on employee outcomes. Publ Manage Rev 7(1): 1-24 
Greguras Gary J, Diefendorff James M (2009) Different fits satisfy different needs: Linking 
person-environment fit to employee commitment and performance using self-determination 
theory. Journal of Applied Psychology 94(2): 465-477 
Haas D, Deseran F (1981) Trust and symbolic exchange. Soc Psychol Q 44(3): 3-13. 
Holmstrom Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 324-340 
J. Cheverton (2007) Holding our own: Value and performance in nonprofit organizations. 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 42(3): 427-440 
José Alatrista, James Arrowsmith (2004) Managing employee commitment in the not-for-profit 
sector. Personnel Review 33(5): 536 – 548 
Laura Leete (2001) Whither the nonprofit wage differential? Estimates from the 1990 census. 
Journal of Labor Economics  
Laura Leete (2000) Wage equity and employee motivation in nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 43(4): 423-446 
Lazear, Edward P (1991) Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5(2): 89-110 
Lazear, Edward P (1981) Sherwin Rosen. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts. 
Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 841-64 
Lazear，Edward P (1989) Pay Equality and Industrial Politics. Journal of Political Economy 
97(3): 561-80 
Mark John Somers, Dee Birnbaum (1998) Work-Related Commitment and Job Performance: It's 
also the Nature of the Performance That Counts. Journal of Organizational Behavior 19(6): 621-
634 
McElroy J. C.，Morrow P. C.，Power M. L. & Iqbal Z (1993) Commitment and insurance 
agents’ job perceptions，attitudes，and performance. Journal of Risk and Insurance 60(3): 363-
384 
Meyer J.P, Allen N.J (1997) Commitment in the workplace. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Meyer J, Allen N (1984) Testing the "side-bet theory" of organizational commitment: some 
methodological considerations. Journal of Applied Psychology 69: 372-378  
Meyer J, Allen N, Gellatly I (1990) Affective and continuance commitment to the organization. 
Journal of Applied Psychology 75: 710-720 
Michael P, O’Driscoll, Donna M. Randall (1999) Perceived Organizational Support, Satisfaction 
with Rewards, and Employee Job Involvement and Organizational Commitment, Journal of 
Applied psychology 48(2): 197-209 
Mowday R. T，Porter L. W, Steers R. M (1982) Employee-organization linkages：The 
psychology of commitment，absenteeism, and turnover.  San Diego，CA: Academic Press.  
Paul lles, Christopher Mabey, Ivan Robertson (1990) HRM Practices and Employee Commitment: 
Possibilities, Pitfalls and Paradoxes 1(3): 147-157 
43 
Porter L W, Steers R M, Mowday R T, Boulian, P V (1974) Organizational commitment, job 
satisfaction, and turnover among psychiatric technicians. Journal of Applied Psychology 59: 603-
609 
Prendergast, Canice (1999) The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature 
37(1): 7-63 
Rachel T A, Croson (2007) Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: evidence from 
linear public goods games. Economic Inquiry 45(2): 99-216 
Robert L Heneman (2002) Strategic reward management: design, implementation, and evaluation. 
Information Age Publishing Inc. United States of America 
Rosemarie Emanuele, Susan H. Higgins (2000) Corporate Culture in the Nonprofit Sector: A 
Comparison of Fringe Benefits with the For-profit Sector. Journal of Business Ethics 24(1): 87-93 
Sugden R (1984) Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions. 
Economic Journal 94: 772-787 
Timothy Besley, Maitreesh Ghatak (2005) Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents. 
The American Economic Review 95(3): 616-636 
 
